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As health information technology becomes more prevalent for most healthcare facilities, 
hospitals across the nation are choosing between performing this service in-house and 
outsourcing to a technology firm in the health industry.  This paper examines factors 
affecting the information technology (IT) outsource decision for various hospitals.  Using 
2004 data from the American Hospital Association, logistic regression models find that 
governmental ownership and a proxy variable for hospitals that treat more severe injuries 
positively impact the probability of outsourcing for IT services.   
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Organization of services at rural hospitals is an important aspect of hospital performance 
and largely affects the quality of patient care. For example, the cost of administering 
medical billing, patient records, and health care safety and regulatory compliance 
continues to be a significant burden to rural hospitals in the U.S.  While numerous studies 
have documented the potential benefits from the use of information technology (IT) in a 
hospital environment (Brooks et al, 2005; Bates et al, 2001; Haux, Winter, Ammenwerth, 
Briggel, 2004), very little research has looked into how hospitals should go about 
implementing this technology. Changes in rural health based programs usually increase 
relevant administrative costs, compelling rural hospital administrators to evaluate several 
business strategies for managing digital information. These strategies consist of either 
hiring IT staff as salaried employees or outsourcing for such services to a technology firm 
in the health industry. Because future legislation may set the stage for data management 
in all hospitals, understanding the characteristics that lead to outsourcing should help 
hospital administrators determine which factors are most influential to their own decision 
process.  
 
We examine the outsource decision in the rural hospital setting and evaluate the factors 
that affect the use of outsourcing for IT by rural hospital administrators instead of 
employing an internal IT staff. The examination of rural health services from an 
economic organization perspective has received little attention historically. However, a 
few studies have begun to apply transaction cost theory to understand the procurement of 
  2services, including recruitment of physicians to rural communities (Fannin and Barnes, 
2007). To our knowledge, this paper represents one of the first empirical applications of 
the conceptual model of transaction cost theory to understand the organization of IT 
services in rural hospitals in the U.S.  This approach represents a new way of thinking 
about the IT adoption decision in that it documents and empirically estimates the 
importance of transaction costs for the various IT options available.   
  
Objective and Background 
This paper focuses on the factors that affect whether or not rural hospitals outsource their 
IT work. Specific objectives include: (1) to develop a conceptual model of transaction 
cost theory that explains the outsource decision by rural hospital administrators when 
procuring information technology services; (2) to identify transaction cost theory 
hypotheses to be tested; (3) to identify the key drivers of outsourcing for IT services in 
rural hospitals in the U.S.; and (4) to discuss the policy implications associated with 
enhancing the adoption of IT assets within rural hospitals.  Additionally, as telemedicine 
services such as teleradiology and telepsychiatry become more common for many rural 
hospitals, this paper looks into some of the issues associated with combining these 
applications into the existing IT structure – and whether that work should be outsourced 
or done internally.   
 
As healthcare information systems have become more and more complex, a growing 
body of research has evolved on this topic.  The benefits of moving to such systems have 
been well-documented, and include error reduction, cost minimization, and more efficient 
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studies on the diffusion and adoption of health IT suggests that despite common beliefs 
that such technology will increase healthcare savings, reduce medical errors, and improve 
overall health status, little progress has been made in the actual adoption of IT services 
such as Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) and Clinical Decision Support Tools.  In 
fact, by 2005 only 20 to 30 percent of hospitals have committed to adopting IT services 
(Fonkych and Tayler, 2005).  Some studies have focused on why those hospitals that did 
adopt health IT services chose to do so.  These studies have generally uncovered a 
positive relationship between the financial status, size, and productivity of the health care 
facility and its level of IT adoption.  Not surprisingly, hospitals that are more “wired” are 
often more productive and have better control of their financial situation (Solovy, 2001).  
However, endogeneity problems made inferences about causality difficult – in fact 
Parente and Dunbar (2001) concluded that health IT had no impact on a hospital’s 
operating margin.  Other studies have found several factors that seem to have an impact 
on IT adoption itself, such as for-profit status (negatively associated), operation in a 
competitive environment (positively associated), higher caseloads of “sick” patients 
(positively associated), and time under operation (mixed results) (Parente and Van Horn, 
2003; Wang et al, 2002).  Further, Borzekowski (2002) found that the implementation of 
Medicare’s prospective payment system increased the rate of IT adoption for hospitals.      
 
Additional studies have questioned which of these services are most likely to be 
outsourced, and why.  Wholey et al (2001) found that the development of an IT system is 
much more likely to be outsourced than the day-to-day operation of the system.  The idea 
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than investing its own resources to develop a proprietary IT system. Such a decision to 
outsource for IT depends on several factors. From a hospital perspective, how can we 
understand the possibilities? In what follows, we use transaction cost theory as our 
conceptual framework to understand the economic incentive factors that drive the 
decision to outsource for IT services in hospitals.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1991) assumes people have 
limited knowledge of future events and act opportunistically. The transaction cost to 
avoid in contracting with another firm are those related to what Williamson calls 
opportunism. Williamson developed a reduced form model that highlights the relative 
cost of outsourcing versus in-house production of services. For example, the reduced 
form model uses three economic incentive factors as determinants as to why a hospital 
would choose to outsource for IT services compared to providing those same services via 
internal procurement with a set of employees who would be responsible for maintaining 
IT services. Hence, the hospital faces a make (provide internally via employees) or buy 
(from an IT firm) decision for IT services.  
 
TCT uses uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity as three primary determinants that 
explain the make or buy decision for IT. Frequency refers to how often a transaction will 
take place to provide services. For a hospital, it might represent the number of times IT 
services would be purchased from an IT based firm for hospital operations. According to 
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employees to provide IT services in-house. Hence, frequency would usually have a 
negative effect on outsourcing for IT services assuming the cost of outsourcing exceeds 
that of in-house production. Uncertainty can refer to demand, technological or 
environmental dimensions that affect outsourcing. For example, a hospital administrator 
would consider the performance record of an IT firm before deciding to outsource for IT 
services to avoid poor quality service and cost overruns. High performance uncertainty 
raises the cost of doing business and a hospital may be better off hiring its own 
employees and providing IT services in-house. Hence, high performance uncertainty 
tends to increase the likelihood that a hospital would choose to provide services in-house 
because the cost of outsourcing exceeds in-house production.  
 
Finally, TCT uses alternative types of what Williamson calls asset specificity to 
understand the relative cost of using outsourcing compared to in-house production. The 
two primary types of asset specificity variables used in TCT studies relate to investments 
made in human and physical assets. High asset specificity means the hospital makes a 
sizeable investment in an IT system specifically designed for its business operations; 
hence, switching costs for the hospital to switch to another IT system would be high. The 
IT firm, knowing such an IT system has been developed for the unique hospital 
operations, could hold-up the hospital for more value at contract renegotiation. Given 
switching costs are high, the IT firm would have some opportunity to capture more of a 
margin. Knowing this type of opportunism by the IT firm exists, the hospital could opt to 
go with a less specialized IT system to avoid the costs of hold-up. Hence, TCT suggests if 
  6the hospital invests in a highly-specific IT system, more control over that system would 
be preferred to less and this usually means hiring employees and developing an IT system 
in-house. Providing in-house IT services would then avoid the added cost of hold-up 
associated with outsourcing to the IT services firm. One type of direct cost of hold-up 
could be a higher upgrade price (than otherwise was agreed to) for the software that 
organizes the IT infrastructure.  An indirect cost of hold-up could be the opportunity 
costs associated with not having the updated IT system, including effects to patient 
quality of care, hiring and managing day-to-day operations.  
 
In this paper, we follow the recent work of Esposto (2004) to identify possible TCT 
factors that determine the outsource decision by hospitals for IT services for two reasons. 
First, TCT has become the predominantly used industrial organization theory to 
understand outsource decisions by firms and Esposto represents a useful application of 
how TCT explains outsource decisions in hospitals. Second, while Esposto studied the 
outsource decision related to procuring physician services, we believe the TCT factors 
considered correspond to other outsource decisions such as IT.  
 
 The key TCT factor considered by Esposto was not asset specificity or frequency, but 
that of complexity. Esposto examined the outsource decision for physician services as 
determined by the complex nature of the average procedure provided by physicians. The 
use of a case mix index was used by Esposto for complexity of services rendered by 
physicians; the case mix index is used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services in the Medicare Prospective Payment System to compensate hospitals for the 
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Medicare patient, his or her medical record has to be updated for diagnoses and 
procedures; approximately 13,000 diagnoses and 5,000 procedures exist all of which are 
represented by specific codes. Based on treatment, each patient is classified into a group 
of these codes called Diagnoses Related Group (DRG). The hospital then receives a 
payment which is called the DRG payment and is calculated by multiplying the weight 
(associated with a DRG which his set by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services) by the payment rate which is set by federal regulations for different types of 
hospitals. The case mix index (CMI) represents the average DRG weight for all of a 
hospital’s Medicare volume, can be interpreted as a relative severity measure of a patient 
population and is directly proportional to DRG payments.  
 
Esposto cited the CMI as understanding the complex nature of managing patients with 
different sicknesses and medical needs. Esposto found a positive relationship between the 
CMI and the use of physician contractual arrangements which provided the hospital with 
more decision rights and control over operations. We believe the same may hold true 
when considering IT outsourcing and the CMI for at least one reason. The CMI 
represents an organizational, not transaction specific, measure of complexity of services 
offered and supported by hospitals. Likewise, IT systems generally support 
organizational day-to-day operations. We hypothesize that a high CMI (which means the 
average complexity of services rendered is high), the hospital would prefer to have more 
control over IT operations and provide them via in-house production, other things equal. 
Likewise, if the CMI is low then we expect a hospital to outsource for IT services. This 
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to manage electronic medical records and other data flows within the hospital. To avoid 
the possible direct and indirect costs of hold-up using outsourcing, a hospital would 
prefer more control over IT and that control would be through in-house production (Table 
1).   
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We model the economic incentives affecting the decision to outsource for IT services 
using 2004 data from the American Hospital Association and the use of binary choice 
models.  This data includes numerous hospital-specific characteristics such as the 
organizational structure, number of beds, volume of patients, and capital expenses.  Also 
included are estimates for the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees in IT-
related work, and whether this work was employed internally or outsourced.  
Unfortunately, data regarding IT employment or outsourcing were treated as confidential 
and required written permission from individual state hospital associations.  For this 
study, such permission was only obtained from the state of Oklahoma.  Thus, the analysis 
in this paper is limited to a single state.   
 
The data obtained allows for a full host of econometric models to be employed, including 
logit models looking explicitly at the in-house / outsource decision.  Table 2 displays 
descriptive statistics for several characteristics of hospitals in the study.  Approximately 
15 percent of all hospitals choose to outsource their IT procedures.  Several other 
variables are also of interest, including the case mix index (which indicates the relative 
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visits, the percentage of all inpatients who were Medicare / Medicaid recipients, the 
organizational status, and whether or not the hospital resides in a non-metropolitan 
county.  Approximately 49 percent of the hospitals in our study were in non-metropolitan 
areas, and the two dominant types of hospitals were not-for-profits and those run by the 
federal government.   
 
Methodology 
A Model for Determining the Outsource Decision 
The decision on whether or not to outsource a hospital’s IT services is a discrete adoption 
choice for the hospital that is dependant on the utility from outsourcing ( ) versus 
keeping the services in-house ( ).  The hospital’s utility will, in turn, depend on the 
relative costs and benefits of the outsourcing versus in-house decision.  Therefore, the 
hospital will invest in outsourcing if  , and will keep the service in-house 
otherwise.   
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The explanatory variables in matrix   are categorized into two distinct groups, those 
associated with the hospital and those associated with the county in which the hospital is 




The results from a logistic regression model are displayed in Table 3.  Our analysis 
highlights several key factors affecting the use of internal IT staff versus outsourcing for 
IT services: (1) the severity of patient illness (serving as a proxy for transactions costs) 
positively impacting the outsource decision; (2) the counteracting impacts of in-patient 
days and out-patient visits; (3) positive impacts on outsourcing of governmentally-owned 
facilities; and (4) the lack of impact from non-metropolitan status.  
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As Table 3 indicates, the case mix index has a positive impact on the probability of 
outsourcing.  This implies that hospitals facing increased complexity are more likely to 
outsource their IT work, which runs counter to our initial hypothesis that the two would 
be negatively related. This may indicate that our proxy for complexity is a poor measure 
for the risk that the hospital faces when it determines whether or not to outsource IT 
services.  Other results suggest that the volume of patients encountered has effects that 
tend to offset each other:  the volume of in-patient days is positively correlated to the 
probability of outsourcing, while the volume of outpatient visits is negatively related.  
This may be an indicator that the procedures associated with in-patient days are easier to 
predict by the hospital staff and are therefore easier to move to an off-site location.  
Although both of these variables are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, 
neither has much economic significance as evidenced by their minimal marginal effects.  
We also see that, relative to the base group of “for-profit” hospitals, an organizational 
structure that is owned by the federal government (either federal or non-federal) 
significantly increases the likelihood of outsourcing.  This suggests that for-profits are 
more hesitant to allow IT work to be done externally, perhaps due to privacy concerns or 
even a perception that this activity is simply not as cost effective.  Finally, the 
metropolitan status of the county in which the hospital is located does not have a 
significant impact on its decision to outsource, suggesting that physical distance from 
potential outsourcing sites is not important.    
 
  12Table 4 displays the correlation matrix of all independent variables used in the regression 
analysis.  Among all the variables, only one relationship is above 60 percent correlation, 
which, perhaps expectedly, is the measure for patient volume:  in-patient days and 
outpatient visits.  However, this correlation of 0.734 is not sufficiently high enough to 
warrant dropping one of the variables from the analysis, particularly in light of the 
differing impacts these two variables have on the outsource decision.   
 
Discussion 
This paper has provided a methodology for analyzing the IT outsource decision by 
hospitals by turning to transaction cost theory.  Applying this theory suggests that 
hospitals with more complicated treatments (proxied in this study by the case mix index) 
should have a decreased probability for outsourcing, since the increased complexity may 
be more problematic for an external firm to handle.  Hence, we hypothesized that 
increased complexity and in-house production are positively related. Our results show the 
opposite - that the case mix is positively related to outsourcing.  From the standpoint of 
transaction cost theory, this implies that the case mix index may not accurately capture 
the IT related opportunistic risk faced by a hospital when procuring IT services.  Instead, 
other measures such as human and asset specificity variables may do a better job 
explaining outsourcing.  Further analysis on this topic is needed to break out the 
individual roles played by these other variables, suggesting an avenue for further 
research.     
 
  13Our analysis does turn up several other interesting results; specifically the positive 
relationships between governmental organizational structures and outsourcing, and the 
lack of significance of a non-metropolitan dummy variable.  These results may suggest 
that hospitals operating for profit still perceive the outsourcing strategy as too risky or not 
cost effective, or may indicate that hospitals that are owned by the government have more 
incentive to look to outsourcing as a management strategy.  The question of how rural 
hospitals view outsourcing is left unanswered by our analysis, but should be further 
explored given the increasing role of IT in the health sector and global flattening taking 
place in today's world.        
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Table 1.  Transaction Cost Theory Hypothesis for IT Outsourcing 
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H - high 
L  - low
  16Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
Description Variable  Name  Mean  S.D. 
Case Mix Index  casemixindex  1.268 0.3678 
Volume of Patients   
  In-patient days total  ipdtot  29,099 39794 
  Total outpatient visits  vtot  70,367 101852 
Medicare / Medicaid Patients   
  % Medicare inpatient  medicarepercent 0.512 0.227 
  % Medicaid inpatient  medicaidpercent  0.125 0.118 
Organizational Status   
  Government - federal  govfed  0.025 0.158 
  Government - nonfederal  govnonfed  0.304 0.462 
  Nongovernmental, not for 
profit 
notforprof 0.430 0.498 
 For  Profit  0.241 0.378 
Rural Status   
 Nonmetro  nonmetro  0.494 0.503 
Outsource outsource  0.152 0.3612 
   
Number of Observations  79  
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Table 3.  Logistic Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable:  outsource (0,1) 
Description Variable  Name  Coeff  S.E.  Marginal 
Effects 
Case Mix Index  casemixindex  4.00080 1.38980  ***  0.17630
Volume of Patients     
  In-patient days total  ipdtot  0.00003 0.00001  *  0.00000
  Total outpatient visits  vtot  -0.00001 0.00001  *  0.00000
Medicare / Medicaid Patients     
  % Medicare inpatient  medicarepercent -3.59200 2.59650   -0.15830
  % Medicaid inpatient  medicaidpercent  6.30220 2.87800  ***  0.27780
Organizational Status     
  Government - federal  govfed  7.49384 2.89900  ***  0.94770
  Government - nonfederal  govnonfed  4.30027 1.48550  ***  0.47870
  Nongovernmental, not for 
profit 
notforprof 1.87413 1.63320    0.10230
Rural Status     
 Nonmetro  nonmetro  0.31100 0.99060    0.01370
Constant -9.57207 2.62320  *** 
    
Pseudo R2  0.39210    
Note:  *, **, and *** indicate statistical differences from 0 at the p = .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively Table 4.  Correlation Matrix 
 outsource casemi
xindex 




govfed govnonfed  notforprof  nonmetro 
outsource 1 
casemixindex 0.197  1
ipdtot 0.258  0.446 1
vtot 0.093  0.267 0.734 1
medicarepercent -0.282  -0.096 -0.133 -0.203 1
medicaidpercent 0.363  0.055 0.339 0.080 -0.247 1
govfed 0.156  -0.089 -0.082 0.288 -0.365 -0.171 1
govnonfed 0.104  -0.336 -0.198 -0.181 0.037 -0.037 -0.107 1
notforprof -0.154  -0.055 0.188 0.179 0.249 0.044 -0.140 -0.574 1
nonmetro -0.065  -0.432 -0.332 -0.215 0.096 -0.039 0.002 0.339 -0.040 1
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